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Abstract
In recent years, the number of Internet users has increased very signicantly. The
utilization of the Internet for business purposes is everyday more factual. However
this exponential growth of Internet users and networks has provoked an equivalent
augment of malicious users. Hackers can take advantage of the low security level of
the network, and hence, access to the valuable information exchanged through it.
As a huge amount of electronic shopping choices become available, the reputation
and interest of merchants and users have an economic value and probable costly con-
sequences. Therefore, security mechanisms are needed for protecting the exchange
of this type of information. When agents are representing users in Electronic Com-
merce scenarios, they are intended to cooperate with their trusted agents sharing
recommendations about third parties, which represents the implementation of an
electronic `word of mouth'. In this way, only the members of the group of agents
should be authorized to access to its recommendations. This particular problem
requires sharp responses according to computer performance, since it is supposed
to be executed in real time. So typical approach {communications protection based
on public key encryption- will be avoided in order to improve the eÆciency.
In this paper, we propose some security mechanisms to be applied in such spe-
cic domain: electronic communities of agents sharing recommendations about mer-
chants. As each agent establishes its electronic community and this group of agents
is short-lived and all of them will receive exactly the same messages, then we propose
a protection based on the combination of hash chains and symmetric encryption.
1 Introduction
In the last decade, the massive access to the Internet has leaded to an increas-
ing interest about its business usage. The huge amount of oerings available
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is one of the advantages of the Internet, but users do not have sound criteria
to select and judge them.
In daily live, people cooperate with friends and familiars in order to acquire
information about the reputation of merchants. By this word of mouth, fraud
is avoided and the decisions gain quality.
But the role-played by `the word of mouth' in `physical communities' can be
applied to electronic communities. This is true even when such communities
are formed by articial autonomous entities, usually called `agents'.
But people has reticence to reveal their preferences to unknown individuals.
The problems come out in electronic societies, which lack a recognizable way
of trusting.
From an information security point of view, humans are trusted because we
believe they behave with certain rules of conduct. However systems are trusted
only because we believe they are enough secure. In a distributed system in-
volving human-like autonomous agents, interactions will be securely driven to
honest neighbors in order to avoid fraud.
There is no doubt about the benets joined to the utilization of the Internet.
Connections to this network are inexpensive and easy to implement and, fur-
thermore, they are enhanced signicantly by ISP companies. However these
advantages must not screen the weak security level oered by this network.
Such security level is inadequate for the exchange of valuable information, and
the only way for using the Internet for its transmission is protecting them by
the appropriate security measures.
Nowadays there is no technical challenge to supplant other Internet machine
(commonly called \IP spoong"), likewise there are abundant software (called
\sniers") for eavesdropping communications of neighboring machines.
The commented risks arise from the way agents communicate, but there are
also security threats associated to the signicance of the information trans-
mitted. The rst type of risks are managed through cryptological techniques,
the second one is one of the hottest topics in research literature of Articial
Intelligence.
Information security is basic for any computer communication. It should be
analyzed from the opposite view of privacy protection and temporal eÆciency.
This trade-o must be solved taking into account the particularities of the spe-
cic application. In electronic commerce both, time and security, are strongly
required.
2 Related Work
2.1 Recommendation in Multi-Agent Systems
Many of the electronic commerce sites like Amazon.com
TM
and Ebay.com
TM
,
are already using systems dedicated to suggest products to the users. The
techniques used include: text comments, attribute based similarities, item-to-
item correlations and even people to people correlations [12].
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When they are proprietary systems, they do not assist users in merchant's
selection. When they are centralized systems, it can be not feasible to trace the
behavior of all the agents in open environments. They can lead to bottlenecks
and they can even collude with merchants. Finally, the recommendations
generated cannot be readable and useful just for human users, or otherwise,
automation is limited.
These disadvantages make agents the appropriate technology for implementing
recommendation systems due to their distributed nature. In fact, they are
one of the major services agents should provide in open systems. In scenarios
such as marketplaces, one agent needs mechanisms to continually acquire and
update accurate information about the behavior of other agents in order to
avoid frauds and to improve its activities [6].
Although some proposals only consider past experiences in order to estimate
the expected behavior of other agents [3], one of the major attributes of agency
is the ability to cooperate with others for improving the performance.One of
the formalisms of representation used to model the expected behavior of agents
is the use of bayesian networks [2]. Other approaches represent reputation with
concrete values dening a range of possible rates [18], or through categories
of trusts with an integer value associated [1]. Even a fuzzy representation has
been proposed in [4].
Fig. 1. A schema of the problem
Usually agents form cooperative groups to improve their performance. In
personal recommendation systems as Yenta [8], this clustering is computed
from user's ratings about its well known people. However this human inter-
action should be avoided.
When clustering can be achieved (from objective and universally accepted cri-
teria), a hierarchy of trusted third parties (TTP) could be a good alternative.
For instance, we can consider the public key infrastructure (PKI) [16] shown
in the following gure. Although the use of a PKI is a good patch, the rec-
ommendations might be based on subjective criteria, and hence any central
entity could give a recommendation universally accepted. So a complete dis-
tributed system of recommendations would be needed [13].
In this distributed approach, each agent has its own point of view and decides
whom is asked for references and also whom answers a recommendation re-
quest [14].
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Fig. 2. A sample hierarchical PKI architecture
A recommendation system should establish the way recommendations are gen-
erated, represented, updated and transmitted. Also, since each agent selects
a group of agents liable to collaborate with, a recommendation system has
to decide how electronic communities are formed and broken up. The com-
ponents of these groups will frequently change, because agents constantly in-
crease/decrease their reputation level.
These groups of interacting entities that collaborate to provide some kind of
service are often called electronic communities. In our context, the electronic
community shares information about the reputation of merchants [18].
2.2 Security Issues
In Electronic Commerce scenarios the information shared about reputation of
merchants has an economic value. User prole (his preferences and likes) is
also valuable information, which privacy should protect.
The security architecture of communications dened in [11], classies the fol-
lowing services that can be achieved by cryptographic mechanisms: privacy,
authentication, non-repudiation, integrity, and access control.

Privacy: This service provides the condentiality of the data exchange be-
tween entities. An encryption algorithm can supply this protection, making
impossible (more precisely, computationally infeasible) that unauthorized
users could access to the information.

Authentication: This service ensures that a user or an entity is not sup-
planted. When a digital signature is used for providing authentication, this
authentication is called \strong authentication".

Non-reputation: This service can be supplied by the source or by the des-
tination of a communication. In the rst case, non-repudiation of sending,
the sender of the message cannot repudiate its emission. On the other hand,
non-repudiation of receipt, implies that the receiver of the message cannot
deny its reception.

Integrity: Supplies the detection or prevention of an unauthorized informa-
tion modication. This service must ensure that the information is exact
and complete.

Access control: This service is frequently confused with the authentication
20
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service. However, the access control is in charge of providing the appropriate
privileges to every user.
Among the cryptographic mechanisms used to provide such services, we de-
scribe the general properties of symmetric and asymmetric encryption, and
hash functions. Interested readers can obtain more details in [17].
Symmetric encryption (also called conventional encryption) has been used
since the beginning of cryptography. This type of ciphering is more used than
others and it provides a very good combination between security and perfor-
mance. However, in order to utilize this encryption method it is necessary that
parties involved agreed a secret key through a secure channel. This fact is a
clear limitation of this type of encryption because it is not easy to establish
secure channels between parties do not know one each other.
By the contrary, asymmetric encryption relies on a pair of related keys, one
secret (known only by the owner) and one public (which is know, ideally, by
everybody), property of each entity of a communication. The public key is
used to decrypt (or sign), while only the public key can be used to encrypt
(or verify a signature).
The main advantage of asymmetric cryptography in opposition to symmetric
cryptography is that it does not need a secure channel to exchange the cipher
key. An entity A can get privacy of its messages with other B, simply cipher-
ing those messages with the B's public key. In this way, only the owner of the
private key will be able for decrypting those messages.
Although slower than secret key cryptography, it is preferable when dealing
with very populated systems. However, every asymmetric encryption scheme
need a complete infrastructure to certify public keys and to protect the private
keys. This infrastructure, called PKI (Public Key Infrastructure), involves a
considerable number of resources that sometimes are not aordable by infor-
mation systems. In other cases the investment of implementing a PKI is not
protable in accordance with the benets that can be obtained. In those cases
the asymmetric cryptography is not used but other cryptographic mechanism
(with lower cost) are chosen.
In this way, hash functions are some of the most interesting cryptographic tools
because of their computational requirements. A hash function is a mathemat-
ical transformation that takes an input of any length and it computes a short
xed-length output. For a given output it is computationally unfeasible to
compute its pre-image.
This property of hash functions is used in some micropayments schemes (as
Payword [19]) to achieve origin's authentication by establishing a link among
consecutive hash values where the rst of all was digitally signed. This ap-
proach is an example of how hash functions can be used to reduce the number
of public-key operations and, therefore, to increase eÆciency at expenses of
relaxing security. In the same way our system will take advantage of hash
functions reducing the computational cost of security.
Because information is only shared with the members of the trusted electronic
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community, membership is one of the most important issues. A preliminary
approach to the applications of cryptography in this problem can be found in
[7]. One of the most interesting proposals about privacy protection of shared
preferences in an electronic community is based on the establishment of a
public key system for each electronic community [9].
3 Our Proposal
3.1 Overview
Below, we will describe how to create an electronic community of trusted
agents, how to communicate with the community, and how these processes
are protected against some of the most frequent attacks.
We assume that a public key infrastructure has been previously implemented,
and hence, each agent knows the public key of its trusted agents (or has access
to it, asking to the corresponding certication authority).
The main goal of the proposed protocol is to fasten the generation of ask-
ing/answering recommendations messages while the security is not signi-
cantly decreased.
3.2 Community Creation
Each agent periodically establishes (and revokes) an electronic community
of agents. The members of the community are trusted enough to share its
preferences and opinions about the merchants.
Fig. 3. My agent creates an electronic community
The community is created by sending a message, which contents a sym-
metric key and the result of the application of N hashes over certain random
seed. This message is encrypted with the public key of the destination entity
and it is digitally signed with the private key of the origin entity.
The key to be shared among all the electronic community of trusted agents,
is generated by the agent who forms it, and it will be implicitly revoked when
other community is formed.
A! B
i
:
f f K
electronic community
, W
0
g K
 1
A
g K
Bi
8i / (Bi trusted by A)
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Where: A is my agent, the electronic community is formed by all the B
i
,
K
 1
A
is the private key of the entity A, K
Bi
is the public key of the entity B
i
,
K
electronic community
is the symmetric key shared by all the B
i
, nally W
0
is the
result of the next process:
(i) Decide the number of times (N ) that the hash function should be applied.
This number will limit the maximum number of messages exchanged in
the electronic community. This issue is not a problem because agent
communities are frequently revoked and created.
(ii) Select a random number W
N;
which will be the root of the chain of hashes.
It will at most be the last hash to be used before the revocation of the
community.
(iii) Perform N repeated hashes of W
N
in order to obtain W
0
, W
1
, W
2
,...
W
N 1
. Each of them can be used attached to consecutive recommenda-
tion request messages.
Fig. 4. Generating a hash chain
Agent A needs no conrmation to ask/answer the member of the commu-
nity for recommendations. Belonging to anyone's electronic community does
not obligate the agent at all. Agents Bi may or not use this membership
whenever they like.
3.3 Asking / Answering Recommendations
Once the community is established, an agent may begin asking the members of
this community for referrals about merchants. Just some of them will answer
this question with the reputation hold by the merchant.
In order to achieve condentiality for the request of recommendation mes-
sages, this is encrypted with the symmetric key shared by all the members of
the community.
Since authentication of these messages is also needed, the agent will ensure its
authorship by including the value that generates the last hash output sent.
Only the entity that computed the hash corresponding to the last hash chain
value received could send the input that generated it due to the nature of
one-way hash functions.
A! B
i
:
f (ask for, merchant M, W
j
),
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Fig. 5. Asking for reputation of merchant
Hash (W
j+1
, ask for, M, W
j
) g K
electronic community
8i / (Bi 2 electronic community of A)
Where W
j
is the j
th
hash output, given that the (j-1)
th
hash output, W
j 1
,
was the last one sent and W
j+1
is the next one to send.
When the destination of the communication receives the recommendation re-
quest message, it should decrypt it and verify the hash received:
Fig. 6. Verifying the hash chain
Bi would send a response only if Bi had references about the reputation of
the merchant M. To be answered, the entity A has to be trusted enough. In
other words, A should belong to the electronic community of Bi. Therefore,
the cooperation between agents would only take place if the trust relationship
was symmetric. But even in this case, Bi might not be interested in being
sociable with A.
The response message contains the reputation of the merchant hold by agent
Bi, and it is encrypted by the key shared by the electronic community of Bi
(where A is supposedly included).
B
i
! A :
f answer, M, reputation R, W'
k
Hash (W'
k+1
, answer, M, R, W'
k
) g K
electronic community of Bi
8i / (Bi 2 electronic community of A)
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Where M stands for the identier of the merchant, R is the reputation of M
hold by Bi, W'
k
is the next hash value corresponding to the chain of hashes
generated by Bi, and K is the symmetric key shared by the electronic com-
munity of Bi.
3.4 Introduction of Newcomeers
The introduction of newcomers in electronic communities is another inter-
esting topic. Assigning a discretionary previously xed reputation rate to
newcomers leads to a problem of tradeos between fraud punishment and eco-
nomic ineÆciency. The former is caused from a high initial reputation rating,
because revivals of agents are rewarded since they will elude the consequences
of past fraudulent behaviors. The latter derives from the poor treatment that
newcomers with low initial reputation rating will receive.
The initial reputation of a newcomer should not be arbitrary. If we suppose
the existence of a hierarchy of trusted third parties, which issue generic recom-
mendations based on an objective universal criteria, newcomers may initially
trust them until they would get their own view of the outside world based on
subjective and personal criteria (created through past purchases).
Once they have acquired that opinion about merchants without the collabora-
tion of other agents rather than this trusted third parties, they can introduce
themselves to become a trusted agent of this community. Comparing the
opinions held by both agents this process can be done. The communication
protocol associated to the transmission of such opinions is a special case of
fair exchange of secrets [3] [5].
The personal opinions contained in this presentation credentials should be
based on real purchases, in order to avoid false introductions. The verication
of the credential soundness can be implemented through receipts with blind
signatures [5]. The problem of newcomers will be extended in future works.
4 Evaluation
In this section we will show how the implemented security measures are able
of protecting the messages exchanged among the agents. Next gure presents
the three messages commented in the overview section: Community Creation
Message (CCM), Asking for Reputation Message (ARM) and Reputation Re-
sponse Message (RRM). Linked with each of those messages, the gure ex-
poses the security services needed and also the cryptographic mechanism that
implements the service.
In the case of the CCM, only the destination agent is able for accessing to
the information (because the CCM is ciphered with its public key). Moreover,
the sender of the message is guaranteed by its digital signature (ciphering
with its private key). Therefore, any other agent cannot forge the Community
Creation Message and, the key embedded is disclosed only to the authorized
25
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Fig. 7. Security services associated to the messages
agent.
According to the ARM message, a symmetric cipher algorithm ensures its
condentiality and the key established by the community creator agent. On
the other hand, the authentication of the message is based on a hash function
chain, only the community creator agent can calculate this hash output and
hence this agent was the sender of the message.
Lastly, the RRM message is protected in a similar way than ARM. The con-
dentiality is achieved exactly in the same way, by the secret key established
for the community. However, the authentication of the sender (in this case, an
agent is sending reputation information) is accomplished by the same method
but using the hash chain created by the sender of the message.
This commented suite of security mechanism permits that the message ex-
change may be developed through an insecure network (where all the ma-
chines can access the communication channel and where it is possible to sup-
plant another machine identity). Likewise, the authentication of every mes-
sage exchanged means that malicious agents cannot spread false reputation
information on behalf of any other community agent.
5 Conclusions
In the paper we introduced an application domain of autonomous agents where
trade-os among computational eÆciency, privacy protection and reliability
of the information are involved.
There is a lack of distribution and personalization in the decision-making pro-
cess related with the selection of merchants. Agents are intended to solve it
through their cooperation. This cooperation consists of exchanging recom-
mendations about others. The recommendation protocol presented in this
paper tries to make electronic commerce trustful through a secure and fast
cooperation among autonomous agents.
The reputation of merchants and the preferences of users are valuable infor-
mation that should be protected when it is exchanged within an electronic
community of trusted agents. This protection includes security services as
condentiality, integrity and authentication of the origin. In our context,
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speed requirements limit the security techniques that can be implemented.
Our solution is intended for dealing with those issues, supplying the precise
security services without a considerable decrease of the performance.
Since the electronic communities are not stable (membership is temporal), and
the content of the messages is the same for all the members of the community,
then asymmetric cryptography is not justied. Instead of using a public key
encryption per recommendation request message, we encrypt symmetrically
the same message for all asked agents, including a previously performed hash
function, which provide authentication of the sender. Therefore, asking for
recommendations is a process protected with condentiality, integrity and au-
thentication services, but not time consuming.
The security level of the cryptographic mechanism used in our proposal is
widely accepted. There are numerous security applications that successfully
employ hash functions like authentication methods (SKEY [10] remote au-
thentication method is an example).
Our scheme oers an excellent trade-o between security and performance.
The computation cost associated to the use of hash functions is simply un-
rivaled. In this way, although authentication based on hash functions have
theoretical limitations that unadvised its use in other applications, in our case
these constraints are not signicant. The security requirements for the de-
scribed recommendation scheme are completely fullled by hash functions.
In spite of the great benets expected from electronic commerce, the mecha-
nisms available nowadays remain untrusted. Our system shows how security
can be applied with a small impact over performance. When the Internet
was designed, the network was not planned to manage this kind of valuable
information, the only way of still use its infrastructure is to include a security
mechanism that protect the information exchange.
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